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I. Introduction
Conservatives as they supposedly are, lawyers are oft en 
viewed as more preoccupied with the past than with the 
future. Legal disputes, aft er all, are supposed to be 
resolved on the basis of rules that were enacted before the 
dispute arose. Legislation is supposed to be prospective 
but, for that very reason, lawyers fi rst turn their attention 
to the commands issued by past legislators, courts and 
regulators when called on to fi gure out what laws apply to 
a specifi c set of facts. So looking ahead to try and imagine 
how legal education, legal scholarship and legal practice 
will look years from now is perhaps not the sort of 
exercise that comes naturally to the legally-trained mind. 
To be sure, prediction is an area where scepticism is oft en 
warranted. Th e art of forecasting is one that is notoriously 
treacherous. As all the proverbial Yogi Berras will not fail 
to remind us, “it’s tough to make predictions, especially 
about the future”. In that sense, lawyers may have 
legitimate reasons to steer away from the soothsayers and 
other fortune-tellers. Some bets, though, are safer than 
others. But not only that. Th e truth is we cannot avoid 
making predictions. Indeed, we are bound to make 
assumptions, however broad and tentative, over the shape 
of the world to come whenever we decide what our 
children should learn at school, what training future 
workers should receive or, more generally, how we should 
invest our scarce resources. In many cases, it is safe to bet 
that the future will largely look like the past and we may 
do better by sticking to these assumptions. But sometimes 
it is not. My bet in this essay is that change is on the 
cards. Th e European legal academy of the future will be 
2 
radically diff erent from what it is today. Whether the 
current generation of law professors like it or not, the 
combination of market pressure, new technologies, 
globalisation and institutional incentives will make 
change inevitable.
Th ese forces may push reform in diff erent directions. 
It is very likely that the transformation of the European 
legal academy will result in a much higher degree of 
fragmentation and stratifi cation. Law schools will 
experiment with diff erent models and their success will 
depend on the response of students, employers and policy-
makers. Some institutions will thrive. Others will struggle. 
Some may well disappear, at least as we know them now. 
Yet, through adaptation and by adjusting to their new 
environment, law schools can, at least in some measure, 
shape their own destiny.
Th e main goal of the present essay is to show how a 
new approach to legal research, Empirical Jurisprudence, 
can help us reimagine the law school of the future. Th e law 
school I imagine is one that retains its dual, hybrid nature 
as academic and vocational institution but which seeks to 
perform these two functions in a much more systematic 
and consistent manner. I shall contend that Empirical 
Jurisprudence can make an important contribution on 
both fronts. Empirical Jurisprudence is a multidisciplinary 
research programme that bears direct relevance to the 
sort of questions and challenges confronting lawyers and 
law students. As we shall see, Empirical Jurisprudence 
embraces two strands of research. One relates to the 
rhetorical dimension of lawyering and approaches law as 
a specialised form of political communication. Th e other 
focuses on law and legal rules as instruments of social 
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planning and aims to explain how legal rules emerge and 
how they then modulate social outcomes. Th ese two 
perspectives are defi ned in broad terms. Both relate to rich 
scholarly traditions and present signifi cant overlaps with 
extant research programmes such as Law & Economics or 
Empirical Legal Studies.
I must make clear that Empirical Jurisprudence does 
not claim to be the sole approach or research programme 
potentially capable of contributing to twenty-fi rst century 
legal education. In the law school of the future as pictured 
in this essay I do see room for soft , interdisciplinary 
subjects such as Law & Literature (particularly in its 
incarnation as law as literature). As for doctrinal legal 
scholarship, it is true that Empirical Jurisprudence and 
the vision of legal education to which I relate it do imply a 
less prominent place for this form of scholarship in the 
future law school curriculum. Relative de-emphasis, 
however, does not entail outright disappearance. Far from 
predicting the death of doctrinal scholarship, the vision of 
the modernised legal academy I set out suggests that 
doctrinal scholarship fulfi ls a distinct, socially useful 
function which should remain a legitimate (albeit less 
dominant) part of a law school’s output.
My argument proceeds in four steps. It starts out from 
the crisis experienced by the legal services industry in 
recent years. Th e evidence strongly suggests that lawyers 
and law fi rms have entered a less gilded age. Driven by 
globalisation, outsourcing, new technologies and fi ercer 
competition, the crisis has resulted in slower revenue 
growth. Lower growth, in turn, has put downward 
pressure on wages and hires. Young law school graduates, 
as a consequence, must reckon with more uncertain job 
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prospects than their predecessors. Th e problem, I argue, 
is one that is not confi ned to the United States or to the 
Anglo-Saxon world. Law graduates in Europe, where 
lawyers also seem to be in oversupply, face a similar 
predicament. I then consider the implications of the job 
crisis for law schools and law departments. Th ere, too, I 
compare the situation on both sides of the Atlantic. Th e 
legal education bubble in the US has spurred a continuous 
rise in tuition costs. With demand for their graduates in 
sharp decline, however, non-elite US law schools are 
stuck with an unstainable business model. Because legal 
education, in most of Europe, is almost free and essentially 
paid for by the state, students have been slower to respond 
to market signals. For that reason, Europe has not seen 
the dramatic fall in law school enrolment observed in the 
US. Still, the European legal academy cannot aff ord to be 
complacent. Traditional institutions, I argue, face a 
choice between reform and slow decay (which may be 
accelerated by impatient policymakers, though). What 
shape the law school of the future should take and how 
Empirical Jurisprudence fi ts in this renewed vision of 
legal education is the focus of the subsequent section. I 
outline Empirical Jurisprudence as a research programme 
and situate it within legal theory and jurisprudence. I 
make a particular eff ort to relate Empirical Jurisprudence 
to the skills that law students need to hone and that 
lawyers of the future will be expected to possess. Th e last 
section goes on to discuss a variety of research methods 
and techniques on which empirical jurisprudential 
studies may rely and which future law students will need 
to get familiarised with. Th ese include text-mining and 
formal modelling as well as the construction of large-
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scale databases. I conclude by summarising the results of 
the analysis while making some suggestions for law 
schools that want to prepare for the future of legal 
education and research.
II. Clouds on the Horizon: Crunch Times in 
the Legal Services Industry
For law students looking ahead, at least looking beyond 
the bar exam, means looking at the job market. But, for 
those who do so in the current, post-crisis environment, 
the chance is they will see some grey clouds hanging over 
the horizon.
Th e legal services industry seems to have entered a less 
gilded age.1 Th e story that has unfolded in the past few 
years has been one of languishing revenue, stagnant wages, 
increased competition, brutal layoff s and even outright 
bankruptcy.2 Th e squeeze has not spared Big Law – as the 
top 100 US law fi rms are commonly referred to.3 Average 
per lawyer revenue – a key metric when it comes to 
measuring law fi rms’ performance – at Big Law fi rms has 
plateaued aft er three decades of uninterrupted growth.4
Nor have the Magic Circle fi rms of the City of London 
escaped the pain. Th e likes of Cliff ord Chance, Linklaters 
1 See “A Less Gilded Future”, Th e Economist (2011).
2 William D. Henderson, “From Big Law to Lean Law”, 38, 
Supplement Int. Rev. Law Econ. 5 (2014).
3 Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, “Big but Brittle: Economic 
Perspectives on the Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy”, 2011 
Columbia Bus. Law Rev. 1, 27 (2011).
4 Henderson, supra note 2.
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and Allen & Overy, too, have faced stagnant profi ts.5 
Admittedly, predictions of the death of Big Law may have 
been exaggerated.6 But a particularly bleak metaphor 
reportedly circulating at large US law fi rms in recent years 
was the Hunger Games – a tournament in which the only 
prize is survival.7 No less gloomy are the scenarios that 
have kept industry commentators fretting about on the 
other side of the Atlantic. Among the most infl uential 
monographs on the future of the legal industry of late is a 
book by British author and industry consultant Richard 
Susskind bearing the ominous title Th e Death of Lawyers?.8
Th at major Anglo-American law fi rms have suff ered is 
especially telling because these fi rms dominate the global 
market for legal services. Large British and American fi rms 
are particularly dominant in the most lucrative segments 
of the legal market: large-scale fi nancial and capital-market 
transactions, high-stakes litigation, antitrust and 
intellectual property.9 So if top-tiers global fi rms have hit 
on hard times, we may suspect that smaller, mid- and low-
tier fi rms have fared even worse. Th ere is little systematic 
data on the economic performances of the thousands of 
small and medium law fi rms in which the bulk of European 
5 See http://qz.com/232258/neverending-bank-scandals-are-great-
news-for-londons-top-law-fi rms/.
6 Larry E. Ribstein, “Th e Death of Big Law”, 2010 Wis. Law Rev. 749 
(2010) (predicting the demise of the large law fi rm’s traditional 
business model).
7 Henderson, supra note 2.
8 Richard Susskind, Th e End of Lawyers?: Rethinking the Nature of 
Legal Services (2010).
9 D. Daniel Sokol, Globalization of Law Firms: A Survey of the 
Literature and a Research Agenda for Further Study, 14 Indiana J. Glob. 
Leg. Stud. 5, 9 (2007).
 7
lawyers work. But the available evidence suggests that 
many of those fi rms have, indeed, faced diffi  cult times.10
Th e crisis that has hit the legal profession may have 
many causes. But much indicates that the crisis is not 
merely cyclical, but structural. To be sure, the law fi rms’ 
woes have been exacerbated by the economic downturn. 
Yet the problem is one that results from causes that are 
not only independent from but which also predate the 
recession. Analysts have blamed a string of factors, 
including globalisation, the eff ect of new technologies, 
more demanding clients and the demise of the billing 
hour model along with the accelerated commodifi cation 
of legal services.11 Th ese forces have unleashed profound 
structural shift s, which even the return of steadier 
economic growth seems unlikely to reverse.
As is oft en the case when an industry goes through a 
structural crisis, the aggregate picture may mask 
important disparities and exceptions. Some law fi rms 
have certainly done better than others. Firms specialising 
in niche-markets – e.g. sovereign bond restructuring – 
may have even prospered.12 Still, the impact of the crisis 
10 See Klaus Werle and Eva Buchhorn, Juristenschwemme Wohin nur 
Mit All Den Anwälten?, Spieg. Online (2013) (documenting falling 
revenue and oversupply in the German legal market). See revenue 
fi gures for French legal sector www.insee.fr/fr/themes/detail.asp?ref_
id=services-2010&page=donnees-detaillees/services-2010/act-juridique- 
compta.htm (accessed 6 July 2015).
11 Henderson, supra note 2. Fiercer competition from new entrants in 
the legal market, such as accounting fi rms, may eat into the market 
share of established fi rms, mid-tier ones, see Attack of the Bean-
Counters, The Economist (2015).
12 Th e top player in the sovereign bond restructuring business, the 
New York-based fi rm Cleary Gottlieb, has posted the highest growth 
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on the legal job market has been dramatic. Everywhere – 
from the United States13 to Germany14, the UK15, France16, 
Italy17, Israel18, Spain19, Australia20 and Belgium21 – the 
talk is of saturated job markets and a surfeit of lawyers.22 
rate of all global fi rms in the past half-decade. See www.legalbusiness.
co.uk/index.php/winners/708-law-fi rm-of-the-year-2013.
13 Natalie Kitroeff , Th ere Are Too Many Lawyers, Say Law Firms, 
Bloomberg.com, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015–05–13/there-
are-too-many-lawyers-say-law-fi rms (last visited July 16, 2015); Bruce 
A. Green, “Th e Flood of US Lawyers: Natural Fluctuation or 
Professional Climate Change?”, Int. J. Leg. Prof. (2013).
14 Werle & Buchhorn, supra note 10.
15 Owen Bowcott & Legal Aff airs Correspondent, Law Graduates Hit 
by Stiff  Competition, Legal Aid Cuts and Falling Crime, Th e Guardian, 
www.theguardian.com/law/2014/jun/29/law-graduates-legal-aid-univer 
sity-lawyers (last visited July 16, 2015).
16 Trop d’avocats en France? La profession réfl échit à des solutions, 
www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/trop-d-avocats-en-france-la-profes 
sion-refl echit-a-des-solutions_1305738.html (last visited July 17, 2015).
17 Amanda Carmignani & Silvia Giacomelli, Too Many Lawyers?: 
Litigation in Italian Civil Courts (2010).
18 Limor Zer-Gutman, “Eff ects of the Acceleration in the Number of 
Lawyers in Israel”, Int. J. Leg. Prof. (2013).
19 Laura Carballo Piñeiro, “Legal Education in Spain: Challenges and 
Risks in Devising Access to the Legal Professions”, Int. J. Leg. Prof. 
(2013).
20 Reality Check for Law Graduates, www.lawyersweekly.com.au/
news/15576-reality-check-for-law-graduates (last visited July 17, 2015); 
Margaret Th ornton, “Th e New Knowledge Economy and the 
Transformation of the Law Discipline”, Int. J. Leg. Prof. (2013).
21 See Te Veel Advocaten in België, Deredactie.be, http://deredactie.be/
cm/vrtnieuws/binnenland/1.2319052 (last visited July 17, 2015); “Veel 
Te Veel Advocaten in België”, Het Nieuwsblad, www.nieuwsblad.be/
cnt/dmf20150427_01650496 (last visited July 17, 2015).
22 Eyal Katvan et al., “Too Many Lawyers?”, 19 Int. J. Leg. Prof. 123 
(2012); Herbert M. Kritzer, “It’s the Law Schools Stupid! Explaining the 
Continuing Increase in the Number of Lawyers”, Int. J. Leg. Prof. 
(2013).
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Th e downturn saw Big Law and Magic Circle fi rms shed 
personnel in unprecedented numbers.23 As employment 
in the legal sector shrank – in the US, legal sector 
employment numbers in 2014 were 45,000 jobs below pre-
recession levels – many young law graduates faced either 
precariousness or outright joblessness.24 What is more, 
those lucky enough to land a job and to keep it had to 
make do with a smaller pay check. Many large 
UK-headquartered law fi rms enforced pay freezes.25 As 
the overall number of lawyers has grown exponentially 
across Europe, revenue per head has stagnated and even 
fallen in some countries. German lawyers, for example, 
have seen average revenue per lawyer drop from 
116,116 euros in 1994 to 97,002 euros in 2011.26
Nor does the future look much brighter than the 
recent past. In the US, post-recession employment in the 
legal sector has lagged behind the rest of the economy – 
confi rming the belief that the crisis is structural and not 
merely cyclical.27 According to projections by the US 
23 Steven J. Harper, “Big Law’s Troubling Trajectory”, N. Y. Times 
(2013); Noam Scheiber, “Th e Last Days of Big Law”, The New 
Republic (July 21, 2013), www.newrepublic.com/article/113941/big-
law-fi rms-trouble-when-money-dries (last visited July 16, 2015); Burk 
& McGowan, supra note 3, at 29; Michael Peel & Sujata Das, “Leading 
Law Firms Cut Intakes”, Financ. Times (2009).
24 Jacob Gershman, “Legal Services Sector Down 2,000 Jobs Since 
January”, WSJ Blogs – Law Blog (2014).
25 See Michael Peel & Sujata Das, “Leading Law Firms Cut Intakes”, 
Financ. Times (2009).
26 Werle & Buchhorn, supra note 10. See also the data collected by the 
Soldan Institute: www.soldaninstitut.de/fi leadmin/user_upload/Anw 
Bl._2013–12__Artikel_2_.pdf (last visited July 17, 2015).
27 See fi gures from Federal Bureau of Labor Statistics Craig Stalzer, 
Careers in Law Firms: Career Outlook: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
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Bureau of Labor Statistics, the legal services industry 
will create a little over 88,000 jobs over the period 2012–
2022. Yet, at the current rate, US law schools churn out 
around 46,000 graduates every year. If anything, the gap 
between supply and demand is even larger in Europe. 
Spain along with the UK, Germany and many Latin 
American countries are home to very large law student 
populations.28 French universities, meanwhile, host a 
staggering 200,000 law students!29 More than the United 
States for a population six times smaller.
III. Repercussions of the Job Crisis on Law 
Schools
Now, it is hard to imagine how the structural crisis that 
has hit the legal services sector could fail to impact legal 
education. A law degree used to be the guarantee of a 
middle-class job and, for the most ambitious and hard-
working students, the promise of a lucrative career in 
corporate law. Th is expectation allowed US law schools to 
charge ever-larger tuition fees.30 As fees rose faster than 
infl ation, most students had to go deeply in debt to aff ord 
the high cost of a legal education. However, as the crisis 
www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2014/article/careers-in-law-fi rms.htm (last 
visited July 17, 2015).
28 See fi gures in Kritzer, supra note 22, at 213.
29 See: www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?ref_id=natnon07136 (last 
visited July 17, 2015). European law schools, though, tend to have 
signifi cantly higher drop-out rates.
30 Max Nisen, “US Students Are Fleeing Law Schools and Pouring 
into Engineering”, Quartz.
 11
made it clear that the well-paid associate positions which 
had traditionally enabled law graduates to pay off  their 
debts would never materialise, students have started 
fl eeing the law schools. Th e last fi gures show enrolment at 
US law schools in free fall. Enrolment of fi rst-year law 
students fell to 37,924 in 2014 from an all-time peak of 
52,488 in 2010, amounting to a 28 per cent drop in just 
four years.31 Th e upshot is that fi rst-year enrolment 
fi gures are back to what they were forty years ago, when 
the United States counted 53 fewer law schools!32
Th us the reality is that the crisis in the legal services 
industry is now a crisis of the law school model, too. In the 
US, this has prompted a lot of soul-searching. Law 
professors, regulators, judges, politicians and practitioners 
alike have put forward proposals for reform, either to alter 
the curriculum or to bring education costs down.33 Even 
31 Mark Hansen, “As Law School Enrollment Drops, Experts Disagree 
on Whether the Bottom Is in Sight”, ABA Journal, www.abajournal.
com/magazine/article/as_law_school_enrollment_drops_experts_
disagree_
on_whether_the_bottom/ (last visited July 17, 2015).
32 Daniel Luzer, “Nobody Wants to Go to Law School Anymore”, 
Wash. Mon. (2014).
33 Brian Z. Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools (2012); Neil Joel Dilloff , 
“Th e Changing Cultures and Economics of Large Law Firm 
Practice  and Th eir Impact on Legal Education” (Social Science 
Research Network, SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1819485, 2011), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1819485; Oliver R. Goodenough, 
“Developing an E-Curriculum: Refl ections on the Future of Legal 
Education and on the Importance of Digital Expertise”, 88 Chic.-Kent 
Law Rev. 845 (2012); Gene R. Nichol, “Rankings, Economic Challenge, 
and the Future of Legal Education”, 61 J. Leg. Educ. 345 (2011); Kyle P. 
McEntee et al., “Th e Crisis in Legal Education: Dabbling in Disaster 
Planning”, 46 Univ. Mich. J. Law Reform 225 (2012); Edward Rubin, 
“Th e Future and Legal Education: Are Law Schools Failing And, If So, 
12 
President Obama – himself a Harvard Law School 
graduate – has suggested reducing postgraduate legal 
education to two years instead of three.34
Of course, Europe has not witnessed the astounding 
tuition fee bubble that has accompanied the rise in law 
school enrolment in the US from the 1980s until its 2010-
peak. Law schools and law departments within European 
universities are mostly state-funded. Some countries have 
introduced student fees. Others have raised them, 
sometimes signifi cantly, as did English universities aft er 
2010. But in many places legal education – just as higher 
education in general – is virtually free. Moreover, even 
where students are expected to pay a fee, statutory caps 
have prevented the formation of tuition bubbles. Th e 
relatively low cost of a legal education, in turn, makes 
demand far less sensitive to changes in the legal job 
market. Smaller opportunity costs imply that students 
have less incentives to reconsider the life-long benefi ts 
associated with a law degree.
Does that mean that the European legal academy need 
not worry about the future? I do not believe so. Yet it is 
safe to predict that, for economic as well as for cultural 
and institutional reasons, change will be slower to come 
on this side of the Atlantic. First, as long as public money 
How?”, 39 Law Soc. Inq. 499 (2014); Robert Rubinson, “Th e Holmes 
School of Law: A Proposal to Reform Legal Education Th rough 
Realism”, 35 Boston Coll. J. Law Soc. Justice 33 (2015); E. Th omas 
Sullivan, “Transformation of the Legal Profession and Legal 
Education”, Th e, 46 Indiana Law Rev. 145 (2013); Daniel Martin Katz, 
“MIT School of Law – A Perspective on Legal Education in the 21st 
Century”, 2014 Univ. Ill. Law Rev. 1431 (2014).
34 Dylan Matthews, “Obama Th inks Law School Should Be Two Years. 
Th e British Th ink It Should Be One”, Wash. Post (2013).
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keeps fl owing law schools have little incentive to change. 
Even a sharp decline in fi rst-year student enrolment would 
probably not cause much alarm. On the contrary, many 
professors, tired of teaching overcrowded amphitheatres, 
might welcome the prospect of a smaller student 
population. Second, life-tenure along with the quasi-
absence of performance or student evaluation at many 
law-teaching institutions do little to encourage innovation. 
Sciences Po Paris Law School professors Christian Jamin 
and Mikhail Xifaras have argued that the bureaucratic 
setup of the French legal academy stifl es initiative, even 
when it is designed to benefi t students.35 Finally, the 
culture that permeates large corners of the European legal 
academy seems itself allergic to change. German-born 
Michigan Law School professor Matthias Reimann, for 
one, maintains that the way the law is taught on the 
Continent has hardly changed at all since the beginning of 
the twenty-fi rst century.36 Moreover, many French and 
German legal academics are proud of their national 
scholarly tradition and seem to have little appetite for 
reform. Such was the hostility of the French academic 
establishment that Christian Jamin and Mikhail Xifaras 
from the newly-founded Sciences Po Law School in Paris 
35 Christophe Jamin and Mikhail Xifaras, “De la vocation des facultés 
de droit (françaises) de notre temps pour la science et l’enseignement”, 
Volume 72 Rev. Interdiscip. Détudes Jurid. 107 (2014).
36 Mathias Reimann, “Th e American Advantage in Global 
Lawyering”, 78 Rabels Z. Für Ausländisches Int. Priv. 1 (2014). See also 
Geoff rey Samuel, “Interdisciplinarity and the Authority Paradigm: 
Should Law Be Taken Seriously by Scientists and Social Scientists?”, 36 
J. Law Soc. 431 (2009) (“Th e way law is taught in many law faculties in 
Europe is not so diff erent from the way it was taught in medieval times 
and this goes for the way students are tested as well.”).
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had to publish their blueprint for an overhaul of French 
legal education in a Belgian law review. Th is was aft er all 
major French law journals had refused to publish their 
manuscript.37
Th ese factors do not favour reform over the status quo. 
And yet change, in the long run, looks inevitable. Owing 
to their vocational character, law schools – just as business 
schools – cannot disregard what is happening on the job 
market entirely. Insofar as training future lawyers is seen 
as a primary function of a law school, lower demand for its 
graduates or the failure to deliver graduates with the right 
skillset for twenty-fi rst century global lawyering may 
appear to undermine their raison d’être. Th e perception 
that law schools do not deliver or, at least, do not make 
optimal use of taxpayer money may prompt policy-makers 
to step in and force reform upon recalcitrant academics. 
As much as it has been the target of criticism in recent 
years,38 US-style legal education – based on the Socratic 
method and a pragmatic, post-realist understanding of 
legal institutions – is viewed by some as a better 
preparation for the uncertain world of global lawyering 
than the more formalistic, black-letter-law approach to 
legal teaching prevalent in Europe.39 Th e doctrinal 
approach traditionally privileged by the European legal 
37 Jamin & Xifaras, supra note 35.
38 Th e extent of the critique, though, demonstrates the intellectual 
vigour that characterises the American discussion. Th at critics of the 
status quo are less vocal in Europe, by contrast, may not be so much a 
sign of academic fl ourishing than an indication of intellectual 
sclerosis. Large sections of the legal academy may be indiff erent to the 
issue or, even worse, wary of asserting views which the academic 
establishment might fi nd unpalatable.
39 Reimann, supra note 36.
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academy has also been criticised for being neither practical 
nor truly theoretical.40 Nor does openness to educational 
innovation and novel teaching methods emphasising 
learning by doing – such as law clinics – constitute a 
hallmark of the European legal academy. Traditional 
lecture-based teaching remains the norm, and, at many 
an institution, virtually the only game in town. Comparing 
educational practices across jurisdictions of the world, 
one scholar has described Western Europe, and France 
and Germany in particular, as the last holdout in the 
worldwide diff usion of clinical legal education.41
Dissatisfaction with the way the law is taught is all the 
more problematic as European law schools have struggled 
to establish research credentials in a context where 
research evaluation increasingly relies on measures 
imported from the hard sciences. Law scholars still largely 
publish in their native language in journals that do not 
meet the rigorous standards of anonymous peer-review 
applied in social-scientifi c disciplines. Much of the 
publication output of law faculties, including 
commentaries and treatises, do not fi t well in the categories 
employed by research funding institutions to assess 
academic achievements and allocate research grants. Nor 
does the lack of methodological training help the cause of 
legal academics when it comes to securing research 
funding. Arguably, what diff erentiates scientifi c 
knowledge from other forms of knowledge is its having 
40 Jamin & Xifaras, supra note 35.
41 See Richard J. Wilson, “Western Europe: Last Holdout in the 
Worldwide Acceptance of Clinical Legal Education”, 10 Ger. Law J. 823 
(2009).
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been gained by means of a procedure that rigorously 
observed the requirements of the scientifi c method. So 
insofar as it lacks a clearly identifi able methodology, 
doctrinal scholarship’s claim to scientifi city is always at 
risk of being dismissed as mere rhetoric.42
Available fi gures do not exactly portray European law 
schools as research powerhouses. A report of the German 
Scientifi c Council points out that law departments 
in  Germany signifi cantly underperform other 
university  departments in several respects, including 
internationalisation (number of professorships held by 
foreign scholars) and research funding received from 
third-party institutions (as measured by average awarded 
42 Th e challenge confronting the European legal academy is neatly 
summed up by Christoph Engels and Wolfgang Schön in the German 
context:
“German legal scholars do not write in English. Th ey do not publish 
discussion papers. Th ey do not make their texts available online. Th eir 
law papers are not subject to peer review. Th ey pay no heed to the 
impact factor. Th ey do not fi nance their research from third-
party  funding. Th ey do not have special research areas 
(Sonderforschungsbereiche). Th ey are epistemologically naïve. Th ey do 
not draft  models. Th ey do not use mathematics. Th ey do not falsify 
hypotheses. Th ey do not use statistics. Th ey do not carry out 
interviews. Th ey do not conduct experiments. Th ere are exceptions to 
each of these statements. But this is a fair description of the large 
majority of German legal scholarship. In the concert of disciplines, 
legal studies increasingly seems to be singing out of unison. For the 
time being, however, the close contact of the discipline with those 
holding power in society has saved them. But the more distribution 
decisions are shift ed to research organisations, the more the pressure is 
mounting.” (see statement on the webpage of the Max Planck Institute 
for Public Goods: www.coll.mpg.de/?q=node/1289 (accessed July 23, 
2015)).
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research funding per tenured professor).43 In the 
Netherlands legal scholars have debated the need to 
articulate a methodology of legal research aft er evaluators 
underlined the baneful consequences that a failure to do 
so would have for the ability of the law departments of 
Dutch universities to attract funding.44 Driven by the 
same desire to secure the future of legal research, the issue 
is now being discussed beyond national borders in 
Anglophone law reviews. In a noted contribution to the 
European Law Journal, Rob van Gestel and Hans Micklitz, 
in particular, have made the case for greater emphasis on 
methodology in legal scholarship and legal education.45
Compared to other departments within academia that 
share the law schools’ hybrid nature as academic 
institution and as professional school, law departments 
fi nd themselves in a relatively weaker position. Medical 
schools are respected research institutions and nobody 
seriously challenges the scientifi c status of medical 
research. Business schools, meanwhile, have less robust 
research credentials. Yet they have adapted and 
internationalised much faster than law schools. 
Interestingly enough, leading business schools in France 
43 See 2012 report available at www.wissenschaft srat.de/download/
archiv/2558–12.pdf (accessed July 22, 2015).
44 For an overview of the Dutch debate see Jan Vranken, “Exciting 
Times for Legal Scholarship”, 2 Law Method 42 (2012); Jan Smits, 
Omstreden rechtswetenschap: over aard, methode en organisatie van de 
juridische discipline (1st ed. 2009). Th e 2009 report of the evaluation 
committee is available at www.vu.nl/nl/Images/Evaluatie%20
onderzoek%20Rechten_tcm9–169244.pdf (accessed July 23, 2015).
45 Rob van Gestel and Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, “Why Methods Matter 
in European Legal Scholarship”, 20 Eur. Law J. 292 (2014).
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(HEC46, ESSEC47, ESCP48), Denmark (CBS49) and Spain 
(IE50) now off er programmes in law next to their more 
traditional business and administration course off erings. 
Founded in 2009, Sciences Po Law School in Paris 
represents a similar attempt to build a new law school 
within an institution primarily known for its role in 
training French corporate and administrative elites.51 Not 
surprisingly, these new programmes give pride of place to 
interdisciplinary approaches as well as to hands-on, 
practice-oriented learning. Th ey promote interactive 
teaching methods through simulations and masterclasses. 
Th ey also focus on the acquisition of skills, including 
bargaining and negotiation, rather than on encyclopaedic 
knowledge of black-letter law.
Besides newcomers to legal education, market pressure 
and a shift  to competitive research funding, technology 
represents another potential game changer. Online 
learning and Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) 
combined with the unbundling of traditional university 
services (like curriculum design, content generation, 
46 Www.hec.edu/Faculty-Research/Tax-Law (accessed July 23, 2015).
47 Www.essec.edu/programs/advanced-masters-programs/advanced-
masters-degree-in-international-business-law-and-management.html 
(accessed July 23, 2015).
48 Www.escpeurope.eu/escp-europe-programmes/masters-full-time/
strategy-law-and-management-full-time-specialized-masters-postgrad 
uate-degrees-escp-europe-business-school/ms-international-business-
law-and-management/escp-europe-specialized-master-in-international-
business-law-and-management-postgraduate-programmes-business-
school/ (accessed July 23, 2015).
49 Www.cbs.dk/en/research/departments-and-centres/law-department/
degree-programmes (accessed July 29, 2015).
50 Www.ie.edu/law-school/ (accessed July 23, 2015).
51 See Jamin & Xifaras, supra note 35.
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student placement, assessment, etc.) promise to transform 
higher education as a whole.52 By allowing economies of 
scale, the rise of the virtual university may off er students 
more (e.g. a well-polished course by a star lecturer from 
a  prestigious institution) at a fraction of the cost of a 
degree at a conventional, brick-and-mortar university.53 
Obviously, the most ambitious students will still want to 
enjoy the experience of studying in places like Harvard, 
Stanford or Oxford. But the digital revolution could pose 
a real existential threat for universities and law schools 
with less brand-recognition.
Decisiveness and timeliness in how institutions 
respond to these challenges will, together with inherited 
brand value, determine the fate of European law schools. 
In the United States, where the top ten schools and their 
graduates have largely escaped the crisis,54 the contraction 
in the legal jobs market is accelerating the stratifi cation of 
the law schools system. Adjusting to lower demand for 
legal education has already forced some schools to 
downsize and to shed staff . It is expected that some schools 
will close at some point in the near future and that others 
will merge to adapt to the new normal of less law students. 
Save perhaps in austerity-hit parts of the European 
Union’s periphery, we should not expect something as 
brutal on this side of the Atlantic, as least in the short run. 
But the odds are that the European legal academy of the 
52 Michael Barber et al., An Avalanche Is Coming: Higher Education 
and the Revolution Ahead (2013).
53 “Creative Destruction”, Th e Economist (2014).
54 Jordan Weissmann, “Th e Jobs Crisis at Our Best Law Schools Is 
Much, Much Worse Th an You Th ink”, Th e Atlantic (2013).
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future will look more fragmented, more stratifi ed and 
more unequal than is now the case.
IV. Empirical Jurisprudence and the Future 
of Legal Education
A. Th e Law School of the Future: Academic or 
Professional?
How should European law schools reinvent themselves to 
take up these challenges? Obviously, there is no single 
right answer to this question. Identifying the best 
strategy depends, in no small measure, on what one takes 
the goal and function of a law school to be. One may be of 
the view that the sole function of a law school is to train 
future practitioners – i.e. future attorneys and judges. In 
this view, the law school of the future should resemble a 
professional school, in which law students have become 
apprentices and are more or less exclusively taught by 
practitioners of the legal craft . In such a school, research 
would be, at best, a sideshow, when not completely absent. 
Arguably, such a law school would also cease to be part of 
academia.55
55 Some US states, including California, Virginia and Washington, 
already allow aspiring lawyers to sit the bar exam without a law degree 
aft er completion an apprenticeship programme. See Sean Patrick 
Farrell, “How to Learn the Law Without Law School”, N. Y. Times 
(2014). In England and Wales, many lawyers do not hold a law degree 
but took a one-year law conversion course aft er receiving a non-law 
degree. In many respects, the British system can thus be viewed as a 
close approximation of the professional model.
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Th e professional school model certainly has merits. Of 
which bringing legal education closer to the practice of law 
comes across as the most evident one. Within the legal 
community, practitioners prone to deride law professors as 
mindless nincompoops out of touch with the legal real-
world may fi nd it especially appealing. However, even if we 
are ready to accept that scientifi c research is not for lawyers, 
the professional school model can only succeed in training 
able jurists if it is properly implemented. Th e challenge here 
should not be underestimated and it is easy to get the 
incentives wrong. Indeed, there is a sense in which the 
European legal academy in its current form already 
represents an approximation of the professional model. 
Again, this is a question for which we lack systematic 
information, but it may well be the case that a majority of 
those who teach law across law schools and law departments 
in Europe either practice law (as judge or as counsel) or 
have practiced law at some point in their career. In that 
sense, the typical law professor in Europe appears to be the 
practitioner part-time lecturer rather than the full-time 
academic.56 Hence, it is by no means a self-evident 
proposition that increasing the share of practicing 
instructors will improve the quality of legal education. 
True, much of the knowledge and know-how that eff ective 
lawyering requires is highly context-dependent. Aside from 
intimate familiarity with the workings of legal institutions, 
eff ective litigation and eff ective dispute resolution require 
56 See the description of the European legal academy on website of the 
EUI Academic Career Observatory: www.eui.eu/ProgrammesAnd 
Fellowships/AcademicCareersObservatory/CareersbyDiscipline/Law.aspx 
(accessed July 30, 2015).
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profound knowledge of the mindset, attitudes and interests 
that judges, parties and regulators bring to bear on their 
decisions. In that sense, law students certainly benefi t from 
exposure to experienced practitioners. Possessing the skills, 
experience and know-how that are the preconditions to 
become a successful practitioner, however, does not 
automatically guarantee that one will be an eff ective 
teacher. Obviously, practicing a trade and explaining it in 
insightful manner are two diff erent things. For that reason, 
excellence in one does not automatically translate into 
excellence in the other. Moreover, as all teachers know, 
good teaching – including the design and development of 
eff ective teaching materials (course-book, visuals, 
exercises…) – necessitates extensive preparation along with 
a good deal of creativity. Demanding as legal practice 
usually is, practitioners thus face a teaching/practice trade-
off  that is similar to the teaching/research trade-off  faced 
by full-time academics. Yet, inasmuch as it makes training 
and teaching the institution’s top priority, it appears crucial 
for the professional school model that instructors 
systematically favour teaching over legal practice. From an 
incentive standpoint, one diffi  culty is that practicing law is 
oft en far more remunerative than teaching it. Not only does 
the monetary gap render it diffi  cult to attract the best and 
most dynamic practitioners, but students must compete 
with clients, associates and sometimes other law fi rm 
partners for the instructor’s attention. What is more, even 
when a lectureship does not itself become a means to 
enhance the prestige of one’s legal practice (subtext: look 
your lawyer is also a recognised academic!), it is not hard to 
imagine how practicing law can be experienced as more 
rewarding than grading exam papers or lecturing poorly-
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motivated students. Deserted by colleagues prompt to leave 
the school’s premises upon completing their teaching hours 
to return to their clients and memos, the professional 
school is unlikely to be an intellectually stimulating place 
where great minds seek to reinvent the law.57 In fact, if one 
subscribes to the view that practitioners are better 
positioned to train aspiring lawyers, a radical – but perhaps 
more eff ective – solution might be to do away with the idea 
of a school altogether and go for an apprenticeship system. 
An apprenticeship system would, in principle, guarantee 
hands-on learning for aspirant lawyers. It would also 
provide established legal practitioners with a large supply of 
cheap labour, in whose training they would have an 
incentive to invest in order to increase productivity – thus 
removing the teaching/practice trade-off .
Diametrically opposed to the professional school 
model is the pure academic model. Instead of bringing law 
schools closer to legal practice, the idea is to bring the 
legal academy closer to the rest of academia. An extreme 
variant of this model would have law schools cast off  their 
vocational tradition altogether and become research-
oriented institutions, in which teaching focuses on the 
acquisition and application of the scientifi c method to the 
legal domain. Proposals such as the “MIT School of Law” 
go in that direction.58 In less radical fashion, emphasising 
the humanities rather than computing skills and 
quantitative techniques, the vision at the heart of Sciences 
57 Th is description, however, may not be far from the everyday 
working experience of many a law professor at most European law 
schools, see Jamin & Xifaras, supra note 35.
58 Katz, supra note 33.
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Po Law School in France is also one that resolutely anchors 
legal education into academia.59
B. Empirical Jurisprudence and the Hybrid Model
Between the two extremes of a purely professional school 
and that of an exclusively academic institution, the 
research programme I set out in this section assumes that 
the law school of the future will retain its hybrid nature 
as both vocational and academic organisation. Empirical 
Jurisprudence, however, seeks to take full advantage of 
this hybrid nature by creating greater synergies between 
the vocational and the academic function. In so doing, 
Empirical Jurisprudence promises to enhance European 
law schools’ performances on the teaching as well as on 
the research front. How it purports to achieve this is the 
focus of the next two sections.
V. Empirical Jurisprudence: Legally 
Relevant, Theoretically Ambitious, 
Methodologically Rigorous Empirical 
Research
In brief, Empirical Jurisprudence seeks to leverage the full 
panoply of social-scientifi c research methods to answer 
questions that are relevant to judges, legal counsels, trial 
lawyers, litigants, compliance offi  cers and legal reformers 
alike. What motivates the choice of the label “Empirical 
59 Jamin & Xifaras, supra note 35.
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Jurisprudence” is the desire to move legal theory beyond 
classical jurisprudence and integrate theorising about law 
with methodologically rigorous empirical investigation. 
Classical jurisprudence – which I identify with the work of 
scholars such as H.L.A. Hart, Hans Kelsen, John Finnis, 
Robert Alexy, Joseph Raz and their disciples – has certainly 
made a great contribution to our understanding of law and 
legal systems. But it has remained stuck in old, now largely 
sterile, ontological disputes such as the separability of law 
and morality or the defi nition of the concept of law. 
Classical jurisprudence has produced a wealth of elegantly 
written monographs. But, while authors have been busy 
outshining each other’s prose, the discipline has hardly 
made any progress, let alone delivered any major fi ndings 
or breakthroughs in the last 30 years. I believe that the 
principal cause of the discipline’s moribundity lies in the 
limitations of its methodological approach and the absence 
of connection with an empirical research programme. 
Classical jurisprudence was conceived and, at any rate, 
practiced as a sub-discipline of philosophy, rather than as a 
sub-discipline of a broader scientifi c inquiry into law and 
legal institutions. From analytic philosophy, jurisprudence 
borrowed its methodology. And so jurisprudence, as a 
discipline, became a combination of conceptual analysis 
(how legal concepts are defi ned and relate to one another) 
and philological study (what did H.L.A. Hart really say in 
Chapter VII of the Concept of Law? or what did Hans 
Kelsen really mean by “Grundnorm”?). Th e sort of arm-
chair theorising that defi ned the discipline was entirely 
divorced from any empirical research programme. Nor did 
the legal philosophers really care to speak to other legal 
scholars or even to practitioners. Obsessed with questions 
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of interest only to members of the discipline, jurisprudence 
has become an insular and increasingly marginalised 
academic fi eld.
In saying this I do not mean to suggest that classical 
jurisprudence has no valuable insights to off er or that no 
law student will benefi t from reading Kelsen’s Pure Th eory 
of Law or Robert Alexy’s Th eorie der Grundrechte. Nor do 
I wish to imply that conceptual-analytical inquiries are 
pointless. Rather, I believe that the way forward for the 
discipline is to make conceptual analysis and theorising in 
general conversant with a fully-fl edged empirical research 
programme. I also believe that such a research programme 
should be consonant with the vocational character of law 
schools and focus on questions that are of direct interest to 
members of the legal community at large.
Th is, in substance, is the idea that underpins Empirical 
Jurisprudence. As said in the introduction, Empirical 
Jurisprudence comprehends two strands of inquiry. Th e 
remainder of this section is devoted to their description.
A. Law as the Art of Persuasion: Studying Legal 
Discourse as a Specialised Form of Political 
Communication
1. Jurists as Advocacy Experts
Th e fi rst strand of research focuses on law as the art of 
persuasion. Law in action is largely about argumentation 
and advocacy: judges, counsels and litigators deal in 
persuasion. For this category of practitioners, legal 
discourse is a form of rhetoric: it is a way of persuading 
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audiences to certain beliefs and actions. Th is also implies 
that persuasion and rhetoric are central to the law schools’ 
vocational tradition: Law schools are supposed to train 
advocacy experts. Th at is, verbally agile people who excel 
at persuasion. Th inking and speaking like a lawyer is, in 
that sense, about “smarts on your feet”, the ability to 
construct and deconstruct arguments on the spot and to 
deliver them with eloquence, as a counsel must oft en do 
in the courtroom. In that regard, lawyers have a lot in 
common with spin doctors, lobbyists, PR advisers and 
politicians. Like lobbyists, trial lawyers use argumentation 
to try and persuade a public decision-maker – in that case 
a judge – to make a decision favouring the interests of the 
individuals, groups or corporations they represent.60
A similar analogy can be drawn between lobbying and 
doctrinal legal scholarship. Doctrinal legal scholarship 
ordinarily takes a perspective that is continuous with 
rather than detached from the discourse of legal 
practitioners. Being itself part of that discourse, it does 
not only observe but also takes side – just as judges and 
attorneys do – in normative disputes. Th e typical law 
review article seldom consists of a mere description of 
what the law is. Instead, it is usually infused with value 
judgments and penned with a view to advance a certain 
vision of how the law ought to develop. In fact, much of 
doctrinal legal scholarship can be understood as an 
attempt either to persuade the legal community to accept 
certain judicial policies or to persuade judges to change 
60 Economists have likened trial lawyers to enfranchised lobbyists, 
see Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, “Advocates”, 107 J. Polit. Econ. 
1 (1999).
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theirs. In blending advocacy and research, description 
and prescription, doctrinal scholarship also bears some 
important resemblances with the working papers 
and  reports published by policy institutes, think tanks 
and business associations. Consistent with this analogy, 
some social-scientifi c studies of the law professoriate in 
Europe have characterised it as operating as a “specialised 
lobby”.61
Judges, too, are, in their own way, advocates. As with 
politicians and public decision-makers in general, judges 
strive to present their decisions in the best light so as to 
avert criticism while maximising social acceptance. Th e 
art of writing eff ective party manifestos or government 
press releases and the art of penning persuasive judicial 
opinions thus share important similarities. To the extent 
that both are concerned with the optimal way to 
communicate a piece of information to a given audience, 
the task of a judicial opinion-writer is no very diff erent 
from that of a PR consultant draft ing a campaign 
manifesto.
2. Th e Specifi c Constraints of Legal Discourse
To be sure, legal argumentation is governed by distinct 
constraints. Th ere are certain properties that an 
argument must possess in order to qualify as a legal 
argument in the fi rst place. Th e eff ectiveness of a legal 
61 See Arthur Dyevre, “Filtered Constitutional Review and the 
Reconfi guration of Inter-Judicial Relations”, 61 Am. J. Comp. Law 729 
(2013); Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone, “Th e New Constitutional 
Politics of Europe”, 26 Comp. Polit. Stud. 397 (1994).
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argument oft en hinges on its being perceived to rest on 
“legal” as opposed to “political” foundations. Th is is the 
paradox of legal discourse. As Walter Mattli and Anne-
Marie Slaughter put it in the context of European 
integration:
[Legal discourse] functions both as mask and shield. It hides 
and protects the promotion of one particular set of political 
objectives against contending objectives in the purely 
political sphere. In specifying this dual relationship between 
law and politics, we also uncover a striking paradox. Law 
can only perform this dual political function to the extent it 
is accepted as law. A “legal” decision that is transparently 
“political”, in the sense that it departs too far from the 
methods and principles of the law, will invite direct political 
attack. It will thus fail as both mask and shield. Conversely, 
a court seeking to advance its own political agenda must 
accept the independent constraints of legal reasoning, even 
when such constraints require it to reach a result that is far 
narrower than the one it might deem politically optimal.62
Th e particular constraints of legal reasoning, though, are 
themselves relative and turn out to be heavily context-
dependent. Argument types regarded as unacceptable in 
one legal context may be routine in another. Some 
arguments – such as textualist arguments – may have 
more traction in some legal systems but less in others. 
Likewise, policy arguments once deemed unfi t for 
lawyers may become commonplace. In the United States, 
62 Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, “Europe Before the Court: A 
Political Th eory of Legal Integration”, 47 Int. Organ. 41, 72 (1993).
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the brief submitted by Louis D. Brandeis – attorney at the 
time but later appointed to the bench of the Supreme 
Court – in Müller v. Oregon63 contributed to the 
popularisation of evidence-based policy arguments in the 
courtroom. By marshalling medical and social evidence 
to defend the constitutionality of a minimum wage law 
introduced by the Oregon legislature, the “Brandeis” brief 
made it acceptable for attorneys explicitly to consider the 
impact of legislation on society.64
Th e constraints of legal reasoning are all the more 
relative as they are themselves partly endogenous to legal 
discourse. As the introduction of the Brandeis brief in the 
United States illustrates, legal actors may by their own 
action contribute to change the perception of what counts 
as appropriate legal reasoning. For that reason, the 
constraining force of legal reasoning is likely to vary not 
only across legal areas but also across space and time.
3. Legal Rhetoric as a Specialised Form of Political 
Communication
Th is warrants the conclusion that legal and political 
discourse do not form distinct genuses but are more aptly 
thought of as cousins belonging to the same species. In 
constructing arguments, lawyers tend to rely on the same 
63 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
64 How decisive the famous brief was in spurring the use of policy 
analysis by litigants, however, is disputed see Ellie Margolis, “Beyond 
Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in Appellate 
Briefs”, 34 Univ. San Franc. Law Rev. 197 (1999); Noga Morag-Levine, 
“Facts, Formalism, and the Brandeis Brief: Th e Origins of a Myth”, 
2013 Univ. Ill. Law Rev. 59 (2013).
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story-telling techniques and rhetorical stratagems 
familiar to PR gurus and spin-doctors. Just like eff ective 
political spin, eff ective legal rhetoric is about more than 
just collecting and compiling facts or lining up 
authorities. It is about doing it in a way that tells a 
compelling story. To borrow an example from the British 
writer EM Forster, the sentence “Th e king died and the 
queen died” is a statement of facts; but “Th e king died 
and the queen died of grief” is already a story. Owing to 
some peculiar quirks of our brain – its in-built tendency 
to search for causal relationships among events65 – we are 
more likely to remember the latter as a single piece of 
information rather than two. And, for the same reason, 
we are more likely to imprint it into our brain. 
Experimental psychology and neuroscience research 
suggest that the human mind has a hard-wired 
predilection for well-constructed narratives.66 Human 
beings, in other words, fi nd a good story pattern hard to 
resist. From marketing to political propaganda, research 
has demonstrated that stories represent a potent tool to 
shape beliefs, change minds and infl uence behaviour.67 
Law is no diff erent. When arguing a case, a good lawyer 
will recognise that there are various ways in which the 
facts and legal authorities (legislative provisions, 
precedents, established doctrines, interpretive canons…) 
can be reconstructed. She will then seek the 
reconstruction – the story – that best serve her client’s 
65 See Daniel Kahneman, Th inking, Fast and Slow 74 (2011).
66 See Jonathan Gottschall, Th e Storytelling Animal: How Stories 
Make Us Human (2012).
67 Jeremy Hsu, “Th e Secrets of Storytelling”, 19 Sci. Am. Mind 46 
(2008).
32 
interests. Hence the best litigators are those who have the 
ability and creativity to line up facts and authorities and 
make them tell a compelling story where no other lawyer 
could come up with one. In similar fashion, verbally agile 
judicial opinion-writers will fi nd creative ways to 
interpret the law, enabling the court to push the law in 
the judge’s desired direction while defl ecting accusations 
of activism.
Cherry-picking, bifurcation and straw-man arguments 
are rhetorical techniques commonly employed by jurists 
that are also part of the lobbyist and PR consultant’s stock 
in trade. A party manifesto typically emphasises the 
party’s achievements while overlooking its failures. Party 
strategists carefully cherry-pick the items that will cast 
their organisation in the best possible light.68 So too do 
government press releases. Ditto for lobbyists. A nuclear 
energy lobbying group, for instance, will stress the 
advantages of nuclear energy such as low-carbon emission 
and aff ordability and play down its perceived problems 
(radioactive waste, Fukushima, Chernobyl…). No less 
adept at cherry-picking are lawyers. In fact, cherry-
picking may be said to inhere in lawyering. Consider that 
in a trial no counsel will be expected to weigh the evidence 
both for and contra her client, as doing so would lead to 
her immediate disbarment. Far from a fl aw in one’s 
argumentation, cherry-picking – that is, picking only the 
evidence and materials that support one’s case – is the 
governing norm in the courtroom. Cherry-picking, 
however, is not confi ned to the memos and oral pleadings 
68 Ian Budge, “Validating Party Policy Placements”, 31 Br. J. Polit. Sci. 
179 (2001).
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of trial lawyers. When lining up the authorities to support 
their verdicts, judges usually emphasise the legal materials 
that favour the outcome they have reached and, more 
oft en than not, ignore countervailing precedents or 
alternative, but equally plausible constructions of the legal 
materials.69 Cherry-picking is similarly prevalent in 
(doctrinal) legal scholarship. Indeed, law professors 
seldom make explicit the criteria by which they identify 
the precedents they choose to comment (“sample 
representativeness”, just as “research design”, is a foreign 
concept in doctrinal legal scholarship). Nor do they 
explain the method by which they construe legal materials 
and why they privilege one particular approach to 
interpretation over other alternatives.
Th e false dilemma, usually combined with a straw 
man argument, constitutes another rhetorical fi gure that 
is probably as popular among lawyers as it is among 
politicians and other professional advocates. Politicians 
seeking re-election tend to frame the choice facing voters 
as one between a reasonable option (re-electing them) and 
an unreasonable one (electing the opposition).70 In the 
69 Pamela C. Corley et al., “Th e Supreme Court and Opinion Content: 
Th e Use of the Federalist Papers”, 58 Polit. Res. Q. 329 (2005) 
(documenting patterns of selective citations to the Federalist Papers by 
US Supreme Court justices).
70 PM David Cameron’s appeal to British voters in the 2015 general 
election represents as good an example as it gets of the combined use of 
the false dilemma and straw man argument in a political message:
 In fi ve days’ time – when all is said and done – it boils down to one 
thing: Ed Miliband or I will walk into No10. If you really believe it’s 
worth taking a major risk, if you really believe more borrowing and 
more taxes are needed, if you really believe the struggle we’ve been 
through has been pointless, if you believe the SNP won’t hold Britain 
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same manner, in legal discourse, a particular interpretation 
of a given clause is not usually presented as one of several 
plausible readings of the clause, but as the single correct 
reading. A counsel will be loathe to admit that the 
interpretation of the law she advocates is one among other 
equally plausible ones, which only have against them that 
they happen to disfavour her client. Instead, she will be 
adamant that a correct examination of the law inevitably 
leads to her interpretation. Meanwhile, the counsel 
representing the opposite party to the legal dispute will 
make exactly the same claim about his preferred 
interpretation. Judicial opinions exhibit the same tendency 
to present the outcome of adjudication as following 
inevitably from the application of legal rules to the facts of 
the case.71 Legal discourse in general, whether in judicial 
opinions or on the pages of law reviews, is replete with 
expressions that seem designed to delegitimise those 
defending alternative views. For example, judges and law 
scholars in Europe prefer to speak of judicial “dialogue” 
rather than of judicial “negotiation” or judicial 
“bargaining” to refer to interactions between domestic 
courts and supranational ones.72 Because it would seem 
that only a crypto-fascist could oppose the idea of 
to ransom – then vote for Ed Miliband. But if you believe we’ve set 
Britain on the path to economic recovery, and want a stable 
Government that off ers security for your family – then vote 
Conservative locally.
 See https://www.facebook.com/DavidCameronOffi  cial/posts/9782 
23018868683 (accessed August 26, 2015).
71 Erwin Chemerinsky, “Th e Rhetoric of Constitutional Law”, 100 
Mich. Law Rev. 2008 (2002).
72 See e.g. Anthony Arnull, “Judicial Dialogue in the European Union”, 
Philos. Found. Eur. Union Law 109 (Julie Dickson & Pavlos Eleft heriadis, 
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dialogue, whoever ventures to criticise the “dialogue” 
theories of inter-judicial relations looks immediately 
suspect. Th e same goes for the no less popular catchphrase 
“constitutional pluralism” which is supposed to capture 
the ethos of judicial decision-making in the multi-level 
EU legal order.73 Another illustration is the “living 
constitution”, which loosely stands for constitutional 
doctrines privileging the views of progressive judges over 
the original meaning of the constitutional charter. 
Whatever merits these doctrines may have, use of the 
adjective “living” suggests that it must be preferred over 
its implied alternative, the “dead constitution”, which 
only the constitutional Necrophile could possibly favour.74 
Th ese examples of legal rhetoric parallel the use of positive 
and negative frames by social movements and interest 
groups. In the United States, proponents of abortion 
introduce themselves as “pro-choice”, which implies that 
the only alternative is “anti-choice”. Th eir opponents, 
however, do not make the mistake of framing their 
position as “anti-choice”. Instead, they present it as “pro-
life”, thereby implying that are pro-abortion militants are 
in fact anti-life. So each side uses a positive frame to 
describe itself and suggests a negative one for the other.75
2012); Shaping Rule of Law through Dialogue: International and 
Supranational Experiences (Filippo Fontanelli et al., 2010).
73 See Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and beyond 
(Matej Avbelj & Jan Komárek, 2012); Neil Walker, “Th e Idea of 
Constitutional Pluralism”, 65 Mod. Law Rev. 317 (2002).
74 William H. Rehnquist, “Th e Notion of a Living Constitution”, 54 
Tex. Law Rev. 693 (1975).
75 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1978).
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We could easily multiply the parallels between legal 
discourse and other forms of political advocacy. My 
broader point, though, is that we should think of legal 
discourse as a specialised form of political communication 
and study it as such.
4. Th e Rhetorical Tradition in Philosophy and 
Jurisprudence
Th e study of legal discourse as rhetoric can claim a long 
tradition in legal philosophy. A tradition that goes back to 
the Sophists – the lawyers, spin-doctors and educators of 
the Antique – and runs through the work of Aristotle, 
Cicero and Chaim Perelman. Th e Sophists were known for 
teaching oratory and for the great importance they attached 
to the spoken word. Th ey played an important role in 
Athenian democracy, advising members of the aristocratic 
class on argumentation strategies while defending citizens 
in court. As with modern-day lawyers, the Sophists were 
famous for their ability to craft  clever arguments and 
counter-arguments – an aptitude that Aristophanes 
parodied in his contemporary play Th e Clouds.
Plato, however, took a dim view of rhetoric and sought 
to distinguish philosophy from sophistry. He had harsh 
words for the Sophists, which his work depicts as 
mercenaries charging fees for their expertise in the use of 
deceitful demagoguery.76 More pragmatic, Aristotle saw 
rhetoric as an inevitable part of social life and human 
76 Plato’s depiction of the Sophists bears a striking resemblance to 
(the no more charitable) portrayals of the legal profession by later 
writers, such as Jonathan Swift  in Gulliver’s Travels:
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communication, as even men pursuing noble ends, such 
as truth and justice, could not escape the need to persuade 
their fellow citizens. To the subject he contributed his 
magisterial treatise Th e Art of Rhetoric. Aristotle’s 
extended treatise has proved a major infl uence on most 
subsequent writings about persuasion through to modern 
days. Interestingly, the Art of Rhetoric examines the use of 
rhetoric both in political assembly (deliberative rhetoric) 
and in the courtroom (forensic rhetoric).
Expanding on Aristotle, Cicero authored several 
works on rhetoric and was himself an accomplished orator 
who set the standard for Latin eloquence. Embodying the 
power of persuasive speech in both law and politics, he 
was a successful lawyer but also a key fi gure in Roman 
politics. Closer to us, authors like Chaim Perelman77 and 
Stephen Toulmin78 revived the study of rhetoric, which 
had been neglected by Enlightenment thinkers, by 
focusing on the use of arguments in the judicial context.
Th ere is a sense in which even the work of a legal 
philosopher like Ronald Dworkin can also be viewed as 
partaking in this tradition. True, Dworkin did not cast his 
work as an exercise in rhetoric, nor as a theory of how 
lawyers achieve persuasion. Yet, like a modern Cicero, he 
was an exceptionally compelling speaker who also 
received praise for his slick, fl uent prose – which, among 
other things, earned him to become a regular contributor 
I said, “there was a society of men among us, bred up from their youth 
in the art of proving, by words multiplied for the purpose, that white is 
black, and black is white, according as they are paid”.
77 Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, Th e New Rhetoric: A 
Treatise on Argumentation (1969).
78 Stephen Edelston Toulmin, Th e Uses of Argument (1958).
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to the New York Review of Books. Th ough the merits of his 
work is a matter of dispute among analytical philosophers,79 
Dworkin certainly fi gures among the great rhetoricians of 
the law. His jurisprudence is best understood as a 
masterful exercise in defence of the US Supreme Court’s 
civil rights revolution. Dworkin insisted on “taking rights 
seriously”80 in a period that saw a major expansion in the 
federal judiciary’s infl uence over policymaking. At the 
same time though, he denied that judges had discretion, 
arguing, instead, that there is a “single right answer” to 
every legal question, including in hard cases.81 He invoked 
“principles” and rejected any sharp distinction between 
law and morality. He described the Supreme Court as a 
“forum of principle”82 while comparing judicial opinion 
writing to the composition of a chain novel.83 Dworkin’s 
themes and catchphrases bear a remarkable affi  nity to the 
characterisation of legal discourse as story-telling (the 
chain-novel metaphor) in which lawyers make emotional 
appeals to moral values (principles, rights and the 
inseparability of law and morality) while denying the 
under-determinacy of law (the single right answer thesis). 
No less remarkable from a rhetorical viewpoint is that 
Dworkin defended his views against the critique coming 
79 See e.g. criticism of British philosopher Simon Blackburn in 
“Comment: Ronald Dworkin, “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better 
Believe It”, 9 Brown Electron. Artic. Rev. Serv. Ed. Jamie Dreier David 
Estlund Accessed (2003).
80 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 76.
81 Id. at 279; Ronald Dworkin, “No Right Answer”, 53 N. Y. Univ. Law 
Rev. 1 (1978).
82 Ronald Dworkin, “Th e Forum of Principle”, 56 NYUL Rev 469 
(1981).
83 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 228 (1986).
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from legal theorists by resorting to classical rhetorical 
tricks. He carefully cherry-picked the cases he used to 
attack legal positivism (Riggs v. Palmer and Henningsen v 
Bloomfi eld Motors)84 and characterised the issue at hand 
in such a way that it forced the reader to choose between a 
caricature of the positivist position and his own neo-
natural law jurisprudence85 – a classical combination of 
straw man fallacy and false dichotomy. He also made the 
work of critics seeking to nail down his arguments diffi  cult 
by ingeniously hiding them behind a smoke-screen of 
defi nitions and distinctions.86 In addition to his knack for 
titles (“Law’s Empire”, “Life’s Dominion”), Dworkin was 
particularly adept at wielding positive and negative 
frames. His theory of law was of “law as integrity”87 (try to 
persuade anyone that he should disagree!). He appealed to 
“principles” where his opponents had only “rules” and 
“pedigree”.88 And he ridiculed metaethics by calling it 
“Archimedean”.89 In sum, the work of Ronald Dworkin – 
who, not unlike Cicero, became a prominent public 
84 See Ronald Dworkin, “Th e Model of Rules”, 35 Univ. Chic. Law Rev. 
14 (1967). Using real cases rather than imaginary ones, as philosophers 
and legal theorists typically do, is itself a clever rhetorical stratagem. 
Because real-world cases do not possess the abstract purity of thought 
experiments, it is diffi  cult to engage the argument they are meant to 
support without taking issue with the specifi c manner in which it 
reconstructs the associated facts and legal materials.
85 See again id.
86 See e.g. Id. (Taking the reader through multiple distinctions, 
variants, defi nitions and reconstructions of concepts and theoretical 
doctrines such as rule, policy, principle, discretion, positivism.).
87 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 84, at 94.
88 See Dworkin, “Th e Model of Rules”, supra note 85.
89 Dworkin, “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It”, 25 
Philos. Public Aff . 87 (1996).
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intellectual aft er a successful stint in legal practice – off ers 
a great illustration of the power of legal rhetoric. Analysing 
the rhetorical features that made Dworkin’s writings 
popular in and outside the legal academy can thus 
represent an important source of insights for the empirical 
study of legal discourse.
5. Rhetoric and Legal Education
To a certain degree, advocacy training is already part of 
legal education. Th is is most readily apparent in moot 
court contests, which are taken very seriously at some 
European law faculties. Yet the fact that persuasion is so 
central to the practice of law militates for an even greater 
emphasis on the evaluation, acquisition and perfection of 
rhetorical skills in the law school curriculum. An 
interesting avenue to promote the place of rhetoric in 
legal education has been pioneered by the Law & 
Literature movement in the United States, which has 
stressed the affi  nity between legal and literary writing. 
Conceptualising legal discourse itself as a literary genre, 
Law & Literature scholars have encouraged students of 
the law to use the methods of literary criticism and 
analysis to evaluate the equality as well as the rhetorical 
eff ectiveness of legal writing.90
In its incarnation as Law as Literature, the Law & 
Literature movement reminds us that eff ective advocacy 
in law, too, is a form of story-telling. Th at law students 
may benefi t from the comparative study of legal and 
literary works is also hard to deny; and there might well be 
90 James Boyd White, Th e Legal Imagination (1985).
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a place for the sort of exercises and classroom assignments 
promoted by Law & Literature scholars in the law school 
of the future. Now, “Law as the Art of Persuasion”, to put 
a name on this fi rst strand of research within the Empirical 
Jurisprudence research programme, does not purport to 
displace nor to dispute the educational value of initiatives 
inspired by exponents of the Law & Literature approach. It 
does claim, though, that the systematic empirical study of 
the rhetorical strategies deployed by real-world 
practitioners may make an important contribution to 
legal education by aiding law students to identify the 
discursive strategies that successfully achieve persuasion. 
It also claims that such an inquiry will be more insightful 
and enriching to law students if it is informed by 
psychology, brain science and systematic discourse 
analysis, as is twenty-fi rst century political communication.
What about doctrinal legal scholarship? Inasmuch as 
it is continuous with, rather than detached from, the 
discourse of legal actors, doctrinal scholarship 
fundamentally diff ers from the approach to legal research 
advanced by Empirical Jurisprudence, which purports to 
investigate legal rhetoric but without being itself 
rhetorical.91 Empirical Jurisprudence, however, need not 
91 Th e diff erence lies in the distinct perspectives that govern advocacy 
and scientifi c inquiry. As Lee Epstein and Gary King observe, legal 
scholarship tends to follow the rhetorical logic of legal discourse rather 
than the methodology of scientifi c inquiry:
“One source of the problem almost certainly lies in the training law 
professors receive, and their general resulting approach to scholarship. 
While [scientists] are taught to subject their favored hypothesis to 
every conceivable test and data source, seeking out all possible 
evidence against their theory, attorneys are taught to amass all the 
evidence for their hypotheses and distract attention from anything 
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entail the death of doctrinal scholarship. It is true that if 
law schools are serious about training advocacy experts, 
rather than militants of the law, they will have to make 
sure that law students learn to discern the rhetoric behind 
doctrinal constructions. Th is can only be achieved if the 
study of doctrinal discourse is integrated within a broader, 
contextualised account of legal practices. Hence, as more 
interdisciplinary approaches receive greater emphasis, the 
place of pure doctrinal teaching looks indeed set to 
decline. With regard to research funding, it is also true 
that, for the reasons detailed above, the shift  to competitive 
research funding does not favour doctrinal scholarship 
in  the long run. Funding institutions such as the 
European  Research Council (ERC) already privilege 
interdisciplinary, frontier research. For that reason, a law 
school whose professors only produce doctrinal work is 
doomed to attract less research funding. Th is said, 
however, the research programme I have just outlined 
does itself suggest that doctrinal studies do serve a 
signifi cant practical function that new approaches to legal 
research will not make redundant. Indeed, litigants need 
doctrinal arguments to articulate their claims, as do 
judges to justify their fi ndings. For these practitioners, 
doctrinal legal scholarship thus constitutes an important 
supply of arguments in the form of ready-made 
rationalisations of the legal materials. Because the demand 
for doctrinal argumentation will not go away – at least as 
that might be seen as contradictory information. An attorney who 
treats a client like a hypothesis would be disbarred; a [scientist] who 
advocates a hypothesis like a client would be ignored”;  Lee Epstein and 
Gary King, “Th e Rules of Inference”, 69 Univ. Chic. Law Rev. 1 (2002).
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long as law and courts exist – I believe that the legal 
academy of the future will and should continue to produce 
doctrinal work. Furthermore, just as political 
communication research may help party strategists and 
interest groups craft  more eff ective campaign messages, 
rigorous empirical research on legal discourse may 
generate insights on which doctrinal legal scholars may in 
turn rely to develop more powerful legal rhetoric.
B. Th e Law as Product of Human Decision Making and 
as Instrument of Social Planning
Law in practice, however, is not solely about persuasion. 
Indeed, practicing law further involves fi guring out how 
legal rules emerge and how they aff ect social behaviour 
while navigating rapidly changing and increasingly 
complex rule systems.
1. Th e Need to Understand the Social Impact of Legal 
Rules: Law as Instrument of Social Engineering
Legal rules serve as instrument of social planning. As 
such, they are designed to channel social behaviour in a 
certain way and those who enact them do so with a view 
to engineering certain social outcomes. Consequently, 
legislators and legal reformers need to identify the 
preferences, incentives and constraints that will 
determine how human agents respond to the rules they 
have designed. Equally, before thinking about the best 
way to package their decisions, judges – particularly 
those sitting at the top of the judicial pecking order – 
44 
must consider the eff ect their rulings might have on the 
behaviour of litigants and other public and private 
decision-makers. Th e necessity to fathom the behavioural 
response that legal rules are likely to elicit is fundamental 
to other key areas of legal practice, including new 
domains such as corporate compliance. For many law 
graduates in the United States but also in Europe, 
compliance is becoming an attractive career alternative 
to joining a law fi rm.92 Yet the job of a compliance offi  cer 
goes far beyond simply reminding corporate decision-
makers what laws and regulations require. Instead, the 
offi  cer needs an in-depth knowledge of the company’s 
business and organisation in order to locate and monitor 
those points in the structure that are most likely to lead 
to risks.93
2. Law as Outcome: Predicting Lawmakers’ Behaviour
As much as instrument of social control, legal rules are the 
product of human decision making. Lawyers are frequently 
called on to predict and anticipate the law public decision-
makers – including judges, arbitrators and industry 
regulators – will produce. To advise her client on the best 
course of conduct, a lawyer must assess the probability that 
the conduct will trigger litigation and the odds of 
prevailing in case her client is actually taken to court. 
While clients want eff ective dispute resolution, they oft en 
prefer eff ective dispute avoidance. “[C]lients prefer to have 
92 Th e Morning Risk Report: Compliance Jobs Draw Law-School Grads 
(2014).
93 Ray Worthy Campbell, Th e End of Law Schools, 49 (2014).
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a fence at the top of a cliff , rather than an ambulance at the 
bottom.”94
3. Managing Legal Complexity: Navigating the Growth, 
Entanglement and Changeability of Legal Regulations
Another challenge confronting practitioners – especially 
those working for multi-national corporations and global 
law fi rms – arises from the need to oversee deals, 
transactions and operations straddling multiple 
jurisdictions while keeping pace with the growth, 
changeability and increasing entanglement of legal rules. 
Not only have legislation, case law and regulation grown 
in quantity and complexity. But as an ever larger number 
of states has joined an ever larger number of international 
legal regimes, supranational law – especially in Europe – 
has become more and more integrated with domestic law. 
Adding to the uncertainty generated by the interplay 
among multiple legal systems is the emergence of private 
regulations of global corporate conduct.95
4. Law as Social Science
Th e kind of expertise that legal engineering, legal 
forecasting and legal compliance require relies less on 
eloquence and the art of persuasion and is more akin to 
risk analysis. Here lawyering is not about constructing 
persuasive doctrinal narratives but about getting the facts 
94 Susskind, supra note 8, at 224.
95 David Vogel, “Th e Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct 
Achievements and Limitations”, 49 Bus. Soc. 68 (2010).
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and the law as they are or are likely to be. Th is form of 
legal expertise also bears a closer and more direct affi  nity 
to the social science perspective.
It is to this form of legal expertise that the second 
strand of research comprising the Empirical Jurisprudence 
project relates and purports to contribute. As with the fi rst 
direction of research, this perspective can point to 
illustrious – albeit not nearly as old – precursors. In his 
oft -cited 1897 Harvard Law Review article “Th e Path of 
the Law”, Oliver Wendell Holmes urged legal scholars to 
look at the law from the vantage point of the bad man who 
seeks to avoid its disagreeable consequences. Th is led him 
to advocate an empirical, social-scientifi c approach to the 
study of adjudication:
What constitutes the law? You will fi nd some text writers 
telling you that it is something diff erent from what is decided 
by the courts of Massachusetts or England, that it is a system 
of reason, that it is a deduction from principles of ethics or 
admitted axioms or what not, which may or may not 
coincide with the decisions. But if we take the view of our 
friend the bad man we shall fi nd that he does not care two 
straws for the axioms or deductions, but that he does want to 
know what the Massachusetts or English courts are likely to 
do in fact. I am much of this mind. Th e prophecies of what 
the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are 
what I mean by the law.
Th e “business like” understanding of law propounded by 
Holmes found an echo in the legal realist movement that 
swept US law schools in the 1920s and 1930s. In the same 
pragmatic spirit, American legal realists – who for the 
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most part were or had been practitioners – advocated an 
empirical approach to judicial decision making, hoping 
that it would help lawyers better predict case outcomes.96
What is more, this approach to legal research overlaps, 
to a much greater extent than Law as the Art of Persuasion, 
with vibrant on-going research programmes. Th is goes for 
Law & Economics, which applies the theoretical and 
methodological apparatus of economics to the study of 
legal questions. Th ere is also a vast political science 
literature on judicial behaviour, which, although initially 
focused on US courts, is now increasingly turning its 
attention to European courts.97 Th ese literatures ask 
questions – whether about the motives driving judicial 
behaviour or the effi  ciency of legal rules – that are of direct 
interest to those practicing law or aspiring to practice it.
5. Legal Education and the Social Context of Rules and 
Rule-Making
Owing to the unchallenged dominance of doctrinal 
scholarship in both research and teaching, European law 
schools do relatively little to inculcate in their students 
the skills and attitudes necessary to excel whether at legal 
engineering, legal forecasting or legal compliance. Law 
students typically study legal rules as if they existed in a 
vacuum and are hardly, if at all, exposed to truly 
96 Brian Leiter, “Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized 
Jurisprudence”, 76 Tex. Law Rev. 267 (1997).
97 See Arthur Dyevre, “Unifying the Field of Comparative Judicial 
Politics: Towards a General Th eory of Judicial Behaviour”, 2 Eur. Polit. 
Sci. Rev. 297 (2010); Lee Epstein et al., Th e Behavior of Federal Judges: A 
Th eoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice (2013).
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interdisciplinary approaches. Surely, many law schools 
allow students to take a minor in another discipline or 
even to opt for a double-degree. Yet the perspective of the 
other discipline – whether economics, business or 
political science – is rarely brought to bear on the 
exposition or contextualisation of legal doctrines. 
Meanwhile, Law & Economics may have become 
mainstream in US legal education but it is far from 
having achieved the same status in Europe.
Th ere is no doubt that many in today’s European legal 
academy are sceptical that empirical and, generally, 
social-scientifi c studies can make any sorts of contribution 
to either legal practice or to legal education. Why should 
law professors believe that social scientists who have never 
practiced law could have anything interesting or useful to 
say about the subject? While the same scepticism long 
prevailed in the United States, recent developments have 
demonstrated that lawyers may have a few things to learn 
from social scientists. In 2002, for example, a tournament 
was organised in which two teams, one consisting of two 
political scientists with a statistical algorithm, the other a 
panel of 83 law professors, had to forecast the outcome of 
all cases on the docket of the US Supreme Court in the 
forthcoming term. At the end of the term, the political 
scientists had accurately forecast 75 per cent of the case 
outcomes, compared to a mere 59.1 per cent for the law 
professors – despite the fact that the latter were leading 
authorities in the areas of law covered by the cases.98 Th at 
98 Th eodore W. Ruger et al., “Th e Supreme Court Forecasting Project: 
Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court 
Decisionmaking”, 104 Columbia Law Rev. 1150 (2004).
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social scientists can outperform expert law professors at a 
task deemed central to legal practice, such as predicting 
judicial outcomes, suggests that the sceptics are wrong 
and that the successful law school of the future is likely to 
see a much more interdisciplinary curriculum.
VI. New Tools for Legal Research: Number-
Crunching Lawyers
Th e two lines of research outlined in the previous 
sections invite us to consider theoretical insights from a 
wide range of disciplines, including political 
communication, cognitive psychology, economics, 
sociology and political science. But to take full advantage 
of the insights gained from these disciplines, tomorrow’s 
law students will have to familiarise themselves with 
techniques and methodologies that most in today’s 
European legal academy have only vaguely heard of. 
While it is not uncommon to hear students cite a 
revulsion for mathematics as one of the chief reasons that 
motivated their choice to study law, the odds are that in 
the law school of the future number-crunching will 
feature much more prominently both in research and in 
teaching. Th e quantitative turn, that US law schools have 
begun to embrace, was already anticipated by Oliver 
Wendell Holmes in the “Path of the Law”:
For the rational study of the law the blackletter man may be 
the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man 
of statistics and the master of economics.
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We have now reached the stage where the man of 
statistics and the master of economics are ready to 
compete with the blackletter man. Even in areas where 
one would expect legal scholars to have the upper hand, 
such as law and development, economists can already 
claim to have more infl uence on policy debates than 
lawyers.99 Unless they update their aging toolkit, 
European legal scholars risk becoming irrelevant in 
political and social debates. Here is not the place to go 
through a comprehensive survey of the many empirical 
techniques that researchers may draw on to further our 
understanding of legal discourse and legal institutions. 
So I will only highlight three: large-scale data collection, 
game-theoretic modelling and text mining.
A. Th e Law in Numbers: Collecting, Coding and 
Aggregating Legal Information
Th e construction of large databases involving the extensive 
collection and painstaking coding of legal information is 
perhaps what one most naturally associates with the 
adjective “empirical” in “Empirical Jurisprudence”. Th e last 
fi ft een years have seen great progress on that score with the 
completion of large databases on courts, constitutions and 
bills of rights. Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James 
Melton, for example, have amassed information on all 
99 See Stephan Haggard and Lydia Tiede, “Th e Rule of Law and 
Economic Growth: Where Are We?”, 39 World Dev. 673 (2011); Daniel 
M. Klerman et al., “Legal Origin or Colonial History?”, 3 J. Leg. 
Anal.  379 (2011); Th orsten Beck et al., “Law and Finance: Why Does 
Legal Origin Matter?”, 31 J. Comp. Econ. 653 (2003).
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constitutional events that occurred in the world since 1789. 
Th e size, coverage and precision (with nearly 300 indicators 
for each constitutional event) of the Comparative 
Constitution Database mean that it represents a real game 
changer for a fi eld like comparative law hitherto dominated 
by blackletter scholarship. Researchers have already used 
the data to test a fl urry of hypotheses, from the factors that 
determine the longevity of constitutions100 to the conditions 
that lead to the adoption of constitutional review.101
Meanwhile, researchers have been busy coding decisions 
of the European Court of Justice102 and the German Federal 
Constitutional Court.103 Scholars have also sought to gather 
systematic data on patterns of argumentation and interpretive 
methods in landmark constitutional cases for courts in 
Europe and elsewhere in the world.104 More research in that 
vein will certainly come. Th at said, there are alternative 
techniques to costly and time-consuming coding of legal 
information that hold great promise for students of legal 
institutions. One alternative is represented by expert surveys. 
As alluded to above, much of legal knowledge is scattered 
across many individuals, locked as it is in the brains of 
practitioners of the craft  who have amassed it through years 
of legal practice. Expert surveys are one way of unlocking 
100 Zachary Elkins et al., Th e Endurance of National Constitutions 
(2009).
101 Tom Ginsburg and Mila Versteeg, “Why Do Countries Adopt 
Constitutional Review?”, J. Law Econ. Organ. (2013).
102 Alec Stone Sweet and Th omas Brunell, “Constructing a 
Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in 
the European Community”, 92 Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 63 (1998).
103 See www.christoph-hoennige.de/?page_id=46#project_verfassungs 
gericht.
104 See www.conreasonproject.com/.
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this intimate, practical knowledge of the law. Well designed, 
a survey may enable scholars to aggregate and harness this 
expert knowledge for the purpose of identifying general, as 
well as more specifi c, trends in the development of the law. 
Another method, crowdsourcing, builds on the wisdom of 
the crowd, using networks of (typically online) volunteers to 
source relevant legal information. An illustration of 
the  application of crowdsourcing to the law is the 
FantasySCOTUS website where law enthusiasts can make 
predictions over the outcome of any given US Supreme 
Court case and win prizes.105 Aside from aiding to identify 
good individual forecasters,106 crowdsourcing allows the 
construction of aggregate legal indicators that have the 
potential to outperform the predictions of individual 
forecasters.107
B. Formal Modelling
Understanding how law works as instrument of social 
planning is principally about understanding interactions 
among legal rules and people: how rules of procedure 
105 See https://fantasyscotus.lexpredict.com/.
106 Intriguingly, the best forecasters of judicial outcomes are not 
always jurists, see Oliver Roeder, “Why Th e Best Supreme Court 
Predictor In Th e World Is Some Random Guy In Queens”, 
FiveTh irtyEight (2015).
107 Indeed, to the extent that the errors made by individual forecasters 
average out, the resulting average prediction will be more accurate 
than each individual forecast. Th is property was recognised over a 
century ago by one of the fathers of modern statistical theory, Francis 
Galton, see Francis Galton, “Vox Populi (the Wisdom of Crowds)”, 75 
Nature 450 (1907).
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infl uence the strategy of litigants in legal disputes, how 
tort regimes shape the conduct of pedestrians and car 
drivers, how judges interact with legislators under the 
rules laid down in the constitutional charter, how opinion 
assignment rules aff ect bargaining among judges on the 
same panel, how docket rules modulate relations among 
judges at diff erent echelons of the judicial hierarchy… 
Because game theory aims to explain how interacting 
agents choose from the options made available to them 
(notably by law) when the choice an agent makes aff ects 
the others and vice-versa, game-theoretic modelling 
provides a powerful tool to analyse the eff ect of legal 
rules on social behaviour. Even a very simple model can 
help sharpen our understanding of an otherwise elusive 
legal problem. Varying the parameter values of the model 
may generate new hypotheses and facilitate the 
exploration and discussion of counterfactual scenarios.
Th ere have been numerous applications of game theory 
to law and courts in the United States.108 Recent research is 
also beginning to shift  attention towards courts in other 
countries as well as international legal regimes.109 One 
model I have developed investigates the strategic interplay 
108 Charles M. Cameron and Lewis A. Kornhauser, Bargaining on 
Appellate Courts (2013); Jeff rey Lax, “Certiorari and Compliance in the 
Judicial Hierarchy: Discretion, Reputation and the Rule of Four”, 15 J. 
Th eor. Polit. 61 (2003); William N. Jr Eskridge, “Reneging on History – 
Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game”, 79 Calif. 
Law Rev. 613 (1991); Daniel Orr, “Th e Superiority of Comparative 
Negligence: Another Vote”, 20 J. Leg. Stud. 119 (1991); Tai-Yeong 
Chung, “Effi  ciency of Comparative Negligence: A Game Th eoretic 
Analysis”, 22 J Leg. Stud 395 (1993).
109 C.J. Carrubba, “A Model of the Endogenous Development of 
Judicial Institutions in Federal and International Systems”, 71 J. Polit. 
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between international and domestic judges, seeking to 
identify the conditions under which domestic courts may 
want to defy the authority of international judicial bodies.110 
Th e model has a domestic and an international court 
competing over competences. Both courts generally want 
to either expand or, at least, maintain their powers. However, 
as the two courts clash, a constitutional crisis results, which 
may, in turn, damage the courts’ institutional standing 
depending on the fragility of the international court’s 
authority and the reaction of domestic legislators. Variations 
in the costs associated with constitutional crisis and the 
value attached to the jurisdictional issue at hand lead to 
diff erent equilibria, refl ecting varying degrees of legal 
integration. Among other things, the model suggests that 
the pressure executive and legislative commitment to EU 
membership put on domestic judges is an important factor 
in explaining the greater level of inter-court cooperation in 
the EU when compared to other international legal regimes. 
Moreover, an extension of the model, in which courts lack 
complete information over each other’ preferences and 
domestic judges also have the ability to issue non-
compliance threats, casts a wider light on concepts such as 
judicial dialogue and constitutional pluralism that have 
featured prominently in the EU law literature.
Assuredly, the assumption of rationality underpinning 
classical game theory (along with most of microeconomics) 
has its limitations, as has been well demonstrated by the 
55 (2009); Arthur Dyevre, Domestic Judicial Defi ance in the European 
Union: A Political Economic Approach (forthcoming).
110 Arthur Oyevre, Domestic Judicial Defence in the European Union: 
A Geostrategic Map of the EU Judiciairy (2014), available at http://
papers.ssrm.com/abstract=2455301.
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literature on cognitive psychology.111 Yet a new fi eld of 
research is emerging – behavioural game theory – which 
seeks to overcome these limitations by revisiting the basic 
principles of game theory in light of behavioural 
experiments.112 To the extent that game-theoretic analyses 
incorporate such advances they hold great promise for the 
study of law.
C. Automated Content Analysis: Text as Data
Finally, a third family of techniques that will surely 
become mainstream in future legal education and research 
comes by the name of Automated Content Analysis 
(ACA). In short, ACA methods are statistical algorithms 
that treat texts as if they were quantitative data. Th ree 
factors make ACA especially attractive for lawyers and 
legal researchers. First, texts constitute a pervasive feature 
of law. Legal rules and doctrines are commonly expressed 
in the written word and lawyers spend much of their time 
poring over texts, summing up the positions of various 
scholars on a particular issue or charting the evolution of 
a court’s case law. Second, thanks to the digital revolution, 
many of these texts are now available online at a few clicks. 
Th ird, ACA methods represent an alternative to manual 
111 Richard H. Th aler, “From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens”, 14 
J. Econ. Perspect. 133 (2000); Daniel Kahneman et al., “Anomalies: Th e 
Endowment Eff ect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias”, 5 J. Econ. 
Perspect. 193 (1991); A. Tversky and Dh. Kahneman, “Th e Framing of 
Decisions and the Psychology of Choice”, 211 Science 453 (1981); 
Kahneman, supra note 66.
112 Colin Camerer, Behavioral Game Th eory: Experiments in Strategic 
Interaction (2003).
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coding and classifying, which the sheer volume of texts 
available makes prohibitively expensive.
I will not review the various techniques popularised 
by the text-as-data movement.113 But I will illustrate the 
power of ACA by showing what a technique called “text-
scaling” can achieve. Computerised text-scaling exploits 
the rhetorical nature of legal language.114 Th e fact that 
lawyers – including judges – tend to emphasise diff erent 
words when they articulate divergent positions on the 
same issue. To assess the performances of text-scaling 
algorithms, it has been applied to a well-documented 
body of case law, the decisions of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court on European integration. Shown in 
Figure 1 are the 16 opinions issued by the German Court 
in the 1967–2012 period and their respective length.
Here we can be confi dent that European integration 
and the relationship between EU law and German law is 
the main issue in the opinions and, on that assumption, 
we can turn the opinions into numbers (or, more 
accurately, into sequences of word counts). Text-scaling 
algorithms then look for diff erences in word usage and, on 
that basis, estimates the decision’s underlying position on 
the dimension of interest, here European integration. 
Figure 2 depicts the results (with vertical bars representing 
95 per cent confi dence interval).
113 For an accessible survey see Justin Grimmer and Brandon M. 
Stewart, “Text as Data: Th e Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content 
Analysis Methods for Political Texts”, 21 Polit. Anal. 267 (2013).
114 Arthur Dyevre, “Th e Promise and Pitfalls of Automated Text-
Scaling Techniques for the Analysis of Judicial Opinions” (Social 
Science Research Network, SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2626370, April 
10, 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2626370.
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Figure 1. German Federal Constitutional Court, Opinions on 
European Integration, 1967–2012
Figure 2. Text-Scaling (Wordfi sh) of German Federal Court 
Opinions on European Integration
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Th ese positional estimates can be compared to 
doctrinal accounts in textbooks and law review articles. 
For this body of case law, at least, they turn out to be 
remarkably consistent with what legal scholars report 
on the decisions.115 All this without actually reading the 
texts!
But there is more. Th is technique permits us to see the 
words that drive the estimation. Th is Eiff el-tower shaped 
word cloud in Figure 3 represents the 11,000 lexemes 
appearing in the 16 opinions.
Figure 3. Word Weight and Word Fixed Eff ect, German 
Constitutional Court Opinions on European Integration
At the top of the Eiff el tower are the words that appear in 
the same proportion across all texts. One can spot “der, 
die, das” – the most common words in the German 
language. Th en on the lower-right corner are the words 
115 Id.
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with signifi cant (positive) weight. Th ese are the words 
that drive the decision in a Eurosceptic direction. Th ese 
are words such as “Volk” (people), “Herrschaft ” 
(governance), “Souveränität” (sovereignty) etc. On the 
opposite side, with large negative weight, are the 
EU-friendly words, which include “Getreide” (cereals), 
“Vorratstelle” (warehouse), “Marktstörung” (market 
distortions). Th ese words compose two distinct frames: a 
constitutional statehood frame, and a common market 
frame. Besides potentially augmenting and amplifying 
the number of texts a single lawyer can analyse, ACA 
techniques like text-scaling thus provide a fascinating 
window into judicial rhetoric. Th is suggests that ACA 
methods can potentially contribute to the two lines of 
inquiry making up the Empirical Jurisprudence research 
programme.
Th is is but a glimpse of the many possibilities that 
advances in data analytics, natural language processing 
and computer-based knowledge-management technologies 
hold for the future of legal scholarship and legal practice.116
116 Among the new techniques that may have the most disruptive eff ect 
on the way both lawyers and non-lawyers manage legal knowledge are 
open-domain Q&A – pioneered by IBM supercomputer Watson, of 
Jeopardy fame – and Natural Language Generating (NLG). 
Applications of open-domain Q&A to law and compliance are already 
under development, see www.rossintelligence.com/ (accessed 
20  October 2015) and www.cio.com.au/slideshow/577060/pictures-
how-ibm-watson-apps-changing-7-industries/?image=3 (accessed 
20 October 2015).
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VII. Conclusion: Reconciling Academia and 
the Profession
Law schools face a double challenge. On the one hand, 
there is growing dissatisfaction with the way the law is 
taught. Assessing the state of legal education in the 
United States – although his current affi  liation is with the 
Peking University Transnational School of Law – Ray 
Campbell is unequivocal in his rebuke of the standard 
curriculum.
Law school as most of us know it is doomed. Law school 
today – which is but a gloss on Langdell’s Harvard – attempts 
to prepare students to practice general law in an 1870s world. 
Students learn a bit about criminal law, a smattering of 
contracts, a little about torts, a smidgeon of property law, 
some of the essentials about how cases are moved through a 
court system. When they emerge, they typically can read 
and analyse cases, and are told they have learned to “think 
like a lawyer.” In a way, they have. But, at least in the typical 
required curriculum, they haven’t been taught how to 
negotiate, they haven’t been taught how to build teams or 
work within organizations, and they haven’t been taught 
how to work with clients. Th ey don’t learn project 
management techniques and wouldn’t know how to discuss 
modern information management technologies. It would be 
considered déclassé at most schools to suggest that they 
should learn how to market themselves, either within the 
organizations they will join or to the general public. Th ey 
haven’t been shown how to build a balanced life in the law, 
one where they can achieve professional excellence and yet 
have a satisfying personal life. In short, they haven’t been 
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taught how to “think like a lawyer” in many of the core areas 
that defi ne successful lawyers today, and will increasingly 
defi ne them tomorrow.117
Even so, and despite the fact that US law schools are far 
more interdisciplinary than their European counterparts, 
it is in their inability to adapt to the multi-disciplinary 
and multi-dimensional reality of the legal services 
industry that Campbell sees the ultimate failure of law 
schools:
But that’s not why law schools are doomed. Law schools are 
doomed for a more fundamental reason: law schools train 
only lawyers. Like a zombie, law schools stagger forward 
reliant on a vision from a past life, ignoring today’s diverse 
world of legal services and the pervasive changes wrought 
by the rise of the administrative state. To live, legal education 
needs to be connected to law as it is experienced today. New 
institutions should be designed based not on what best 
serves law students or legal educators, but on what best 
serves the needs of today’s society.118
As seen in the present essay, this line of criticism has 
found some echo in some – albeit for now still somewhat 
isolated – corners of the European legal academy. Even 
though European legal educators have little incentive to 
embrace change, the odds are criticism will grow more 
frequent and more strident as law schools are perceived to 
fail their vocational mission.
117 Campbell, supra note 94.
118 Id.
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Th e other challenge is research. To the extent that 
doctrinal scholarship continues to be their sole research 
output, European law schools will struggle to establish 
research credentials and risk gradual marginalisation 
within academia, to the point that their very place of the 
legal discipline within academia may one day be called 
into question.
In the present essay, I have made the case for Empirical 
Jurisprudence and argued that European law schools 
should embrace its research programme in order to 
address these two challenges. Law schools need not shed 
their hybrid identity as both vocational and academic 
institution. But they need to fulfi l these two missions 
better. Th is is the promise of Empirical Jurisprudence.
